Neoclassical economists have advocated the use of pricing instruments as a fundamental tool for achieving sustainability of water systems and an efficient allocation of water resources. This idea has been accepted in worldwide agreed definitions of sustainability, where "full-cost recovery" is considered as a basic requirement. In this paper, we argue that water pricing (aiming at allocative objectives) and cost recovery can often be at odds, while prevalence of one or the other objective also depends on whether the main issue at stake is financing infrastructure development and maintenance, or rather allocating scarce water resources. Therefore, the two issues should be dealt with separately and require different approaches to pricing.
Introduction
Full-cost recovery (FCR) of water services through charges paid by users and polluters of water is commonly regarded as a cornerstone of sustainable water management and has been clearly adopted by the European Union as one of the key principles at the base of the Water Framework Directive (Dir. 2000/60, hereafter WFD) (Pearce, 1999; European Commission, 2000) . Most countries in the world are engaging in water pricing reforms whose main feature is the shift of economic burden from the public budget to users (Jones, 1998; OECD, 1987 OECD, , 2000 . International institutions strongly support FCR as a way to guarantee revenues of water service operators and allow private sector involvement and market finance (Winpenny, 2003) . While apparently obvious and well accepted by common sense, this principle is in fact far less clear and straightforward than it is commonly believed. It hides instead many different, sometimes overlapping and conflicting objectives, which should be considered separately. Why these differentand somehow conflicting -objectives have finally converged into the operational concept of FCR is neither clear nor necessarily justifiable on a theoretical basis.
In this article, we concentrate on public water supply and sanitation services (PWSS) and on the economic dimension. Economic justifications for water pricing are first discussed, showing its different meanings and aims. The theoretical background behind the assumption that pricing improves efficiency is analysed and discussed. These theoretical arguments are then discussed in the realm of PWSS industry, having in mind in particular, though not exclusively, the European context. We suggest that allocative benefits of FCR are less clear and less obvious than usually assumed and that potential allocative benefits of water pricing have been somewhat overestimated in the PWSS sector, owing to practical difficulties in implementing marginal cost pricing and low demand elasticity.
In turn, the most important benefit to be expected from pricing arises from the opportunity to ensure financial self-sustainability for the water industry, a necessary condition for private sector involvement and defiscalization. If this is true, however, the obsession of neoclassical economists with marginal cost pricing could be well tempered, creating space for introducing mutualisation, solidarity and equalization schemes.
We argue then that two rather different approaches to pricing should be considered, according to policy priorities. Pricing water resources and pricing PWSS services are different issues; the former is justified in case of scarcity of water resources as an environmental policy instrument, while the latter concerns the efficient and sustainable development of infrastructure, its maintenance and renewal in the long run, as well as the avoidance of monopoly rents. This is particularly true in the European context. WFD provision for FCR should be intended in a more flexible way, while a clearer distinction should be made between prices intended as economic instruments aimed at efficient allocation and those for FCR.
Prices as allocative instruments: the economic rationale

Alternative perspectives on water pricing
From a microeconomic point of view, prices are allocative instruments aimed at an efficient allocation of resources as a reflection of the value they have in alternative uses. Environmental economics looks at them as incentives aimed at changing consumers' and operators' behaviour according to any desired environmental policy objective. For management sciences, prices are a source of revenue that should enable operators to balance costs and allow a fair profit. From the perspective of public finance, prices are one of the possible channels through which services of general interest and infrastructure can be financed, alternative to the general budget. Regulatory economics considers PWSS, as other public utilities, as a relevant case of natural monopoly, and therefore water pricing as a way to avoid the capture of monopoly rents (both in terms of excess profits and x-inefficiency, the economic theory recognizes different sources of inefficiency, namely allocative and x-inefficiency. The former concerns a misallocation of resources (labour and capital are used in order to produce less valuable outputs); the latter concerns the excessive use of inputs for the same output and therefore a higher cost) on the side of the supply company. Economic policy might consider prices as a way to leverage private sector involvement and thus guarantee that private capital markets can invest in the water sector.
In a more general perspective, pricing can be analysed at the crossing of alternative technical, ethical and juridical principles of water management (Hoekstra, 1998) : the polluter-pays principle and affordability; commodification of water and guarantee of social rights; privatization of property rights for water and managing water as a common property; competition law (water subsidies as "state aid" that distort competition) and public grants to compensate services of general interest.
Finally, pricing reform has been analysed for its political and institutional implications (Dinar, 2000) . Shifting from the status quo to a water economy based on user-paid prices and charges also entails distributional effects and institutional change concerning the property rights regime; as with any institutional change, it has winners and losers, who will compete in the policy arena in order to conquer the largest possible share of the benefits.
Benefits from pricing: the standard theory
For neoclassical economics, prices of any good should reflect its marginal cost (MC), namely the additional cost that is required in order to supply an additional quantity. In a well-functioning market, the interplay of supply and demand automatically reaches an equilibrium in which the price of the good is equal to MC, which is what guarantees efficiency. Prices are an equilibrating factor both for supply and demand: only suppliers with the lowest marginal costs are able to survive and only users whose willingness to pay (WTP) is higher than the market price will purchase the goods. Even when markets cannot function, the state can achieve an optimal allocation of resources by imposing pricing rules that simulate what the market would have spontaneously achieved. Figure 1 illustrates the rationale for water pricing in a context of positive marginal costs of supply. Free supply -or flat-rate tariffs -encourage users to demand water until their marginal benefit is equal to zero; this causes an excess demand with respect to the social optimum Q*: the cost of additional supply corresponds to the area ABQ*Q 1 , while the additional benefit is measured by area AQ*Q 1 ; the difference (ABQ 1 ) is the measure of allocative inefficiency. Pricing at the marginal cost would resolve the problem, since users with a marginal benefit lower than MC would not purchase the additional quantity.
In Figure 2 , prices are used in order to solve the problem of allocating water between alternative uses and the scope for building new water supply facilities. We can imagine a typical situation with a highvalue use (e.g. drinking water supply), with a maximum demanded quantity; and a low-value use (e.g. irrigation). We can also imagine two alternative supply sources, cheap local supplies and external supply from a backstop source (e.g. desalination, water transfers). In a regime of administrative planning of resources and no tradability of water rights, high-value uses might be forced to use costly supplies, while cheap water will be used by low-value uses. The efficiency gains from pricing are shown in the right side of the figure: a price calculated on the basis of production and scarcity costs allows the scarce cheap resource to be allocated to the most beneficial uses first and low-value uses have the remaining part. Figure 3 shows more in detail the allocative process meant by water pricing. We can assume that a fixed amount of water is available (AA'), with two competing users. Each demand curve is calculated as the net-back value of water (revenue deriving from water use -financial cost of water supply). If the available quantity is more than the scarcity threshold, both water demands can be satisfied. If it is lower, the optimal allocation (Q*) can be achieved with an optimal water price ( p*), either through direct bargaining between users (a-la-Coase) or through different mechanisms (e.g. a competitive bid auctioned by the resource owner) 1 . Figure 4 shows a further potential for pricing, as an environmental tax "a-la-Baumol-Oates" (Baumol & Oates, 1988) . Environmental regulators can fix an exogenously determined policy target, and then choose the pricing level that encourages water users to make the optimum effort. If the environmental policymaker wishes to achieve an effort E* (e.g. to save water or to reduce pollution), a price p* will induce users to produce it. If the effort is lower than expected, prices can be increased accordingly. More generally, prices can be used as an instrument aimed at changing consumer's behaviour in any desired direction, provided that the pricing base is correlated with the concerned outcome and price elasticity is high enough.
It is important to stress that allocative benefits depend on the fact that prices are calculated on the basis of marginal costs and not simply that they allow the recovery of full costs. As we have seen in Figure 1 , flat tariffs, although enabling cost recovery, do not have any allocative effect at the margin; they could eventually have an effect on demand only in case the total cost would be high enough so as to outweigh completely the benefit from water use, in which case demand would drop to zero 2 . On the other hand, price based on marginal cost might not necessarily guarantee cost recovery, in case economies of scale cause MC to be lower than average cost (AC). 1 In this case p* is equal to the scarcity cost, since financial costs are already included in the net-back demand curve. 2 An intermediate case could occur if the user has alternative options available for improving water efficiency (e.g. introduce pressure irrigation in order to reduce per-ha consumption). Here, again, a flat tariff could be used in order to give incentive to the investment; however the effect would be entirely dependent on the absolute level of extra cost, confronting the additional cost of saving measures.
2.3. Benefits of pricing: adjustments to standard theory in order to fit in the PWSS sector
In the short run, PWSS costs are fixed for the largest part (80-90% or more) and variable costs are very low or even negligible. Economic theory suggests that from a social welfare point of view it is inefficient to leave capacity unused if there are customers ready to pay at least as much as the short-run marginal cost (SRMC). This is true while the capacity of the infrastructure is not reached: charging a price above the SRMC (in order to recover the fixed cost) leads to an inefficient outcome, since users with a lower WTP are excluded without any social benefit ( Figure 5 ). When demand approaches the infrastructure capacity, the optimal strategy would be to price at the marginal cost of the cheapest alternative source 3 that would be able to meet the additional demand, provided that it is feasible to meter demand in peak and off-peak periods (Spulber & Sabbaghi, 1994) .
On the other hand, excess capacity occurs probably because a wrong assumption about water demand was made at the time of investment. If users are not asked to contribute to the investment cost (that is, if they do not pay the long-run marginal costs (LRMC)), they will receive the wrong signal, generating an excess demand. Investment would not have been judged worthwhile if users would have to pay the full cost. This is a particularly critical issue in the water sector, given the impossibility of converting most assets to alternative uses once they have been put in place, and because of irreversibility of demand, meaning that once established many water uses cannot be easily reduced since users have incurred significant sunk costs that would otherwise be lost 4 . It is thus important that water users receive the right signal from the beginning, before their water-demanding activities have developed. 3 The cheapest alternative could be to force some users to give up their demand; in that case the marginal concerned cost would be the scarcity cost (the economic value of water for those users who would be left unsatisfied). 4 For example, an industrial plant needing a given quantity of water might be located in an area or not; once it has been located, its demand elasticity is very low because it can reduce demand only by transferring production elsewhere.
However, optimal sizing of infrastructure is a very delicate issue and some over-capacity should not be considered necessarily as a bad thing. Given the very long life of infrastructure and the impossibility of predicting demand over such a large horizon, some over-capacity can be preferred in case an extension of the system afterwards is more costly than building it big from the start. Future value of water services for users cannot be fully anticipated. Future demand depends on future urban development trends, but the reverse can also be true, in the sense that a well-equipped PWSS is a precondition for future urban development to occur. Moreover, in case of quantitative or qualitative water stress, some over-capacity of the system could ensure its resilience. Even taking this into consideration, however, it can be believed that cost-reflecting prices would enable users to make correct evaluations whether a certain system is justified or not by the (social) value attributed to actual supply as well as other components of future supply such as resilience and option values.
Things become more complicated if we add a further consideration, which is quite relevant to the water sector, namely indivisibility of supply. PWSS infrastructure capacity cannot be freely adapted to demand; enlarging the system is normally possible only by adding new facilities that have a fixed capacity. It can be demonstrated that the optimal rule in this case is to charge a price that corresponds to the SRMC and is eventually augmented by a value that corresponds to the scarcity cost for that quantity (Hanemann, 1998) .
The problem is illustrated by Figure 6 , in which we imagine that supply is available in a finite quantity Q 1 and the system operator has the choice whether to expand capacity at the same average and marginal cost, but with a constraint in capacity (capacity can be expanded only at Q 2 ). Consider Q 1 first. If demand is lower than D 1 , the optimal policy charges the SRMC (the same case as in Figure 1 ). When demand is greater than D 1 , if p ¼ SRMC there would be an excess demand. With capacity freely variable, the optimal capacity choice would be Q* and it could be achieved by charging p ¼ LRMC.
Since we have assumed that capacity is not freely adjustable, the option is now whether to invest in new capacity (for an extra total cost corresponding to the area FCQ 1 Q 2 ), and what price should be charged. For demand functions lying in the region between D 1 and D 3 (for example D 2 ), the extra consumer surplus (measured by the area below the demand curve between Q 1 and the quantity that would be purchased at p ¼ SRMC) is always less than the extra cost; expansion should not take place and the optimal price is p ¼ SRMC þSR 1 5 . If demand lies in the region at the upper right of D 3 (e.g. D 4 ) the answer is not that obvious. Consumer surplus after the investment is made is Q 1 ABQ 2 , while extra cost is FCQ 2 Q 1 . If AFD . DCB, enlargement is worthwhile; after it is made, however, it would be inefficient to charge the LRMC (since demand would be reduced to Q 3 , with a reduction of consumer surplus. The optimal price would therefore again be SRMC, eventually augmented by the new scarcity rent emerging at Q 2 (SR 2 , in our case). The slope of the demand curve has a decisive role to play: the more inelastic is the demand, the greater is area AFD and thus the economic convenience of enlarging the infrastructure at Q 2 .
Charging below the LRMC, however, impedes full recovery of costs: as we noted in the previous section, unless depreciation costs (calculated on the basis of reconstruction cost) are transferred into price, the system is "condemned" to rely on public subsidies at the time when replacement will be necessary. A solution could be to charge users on a lump-sum basis instead of on a marginal-cost basis. The difference could be covered, for example, through a fixed connection charge. The adoption of a fixed charge would serve cost recovery only and have no effect on water demand; it might influence in turn the decision whether to connect or not, since users will be willing to connect only if their consumer surplus is greater than the fixed charge. Again, the price operates as a signal: investment for enlarging capacity would be economically worthwhile only if there are a sufficient number of customers willing to pay the fixed charge and connect. 5 SR 1 can be interpreted as the scarcity rent arising at Q 1 ; at which price, consumers with a WTP lower than p ¼ SRMC þ SR 1 would be excluded and the available quantity Q 1 would be allocated efficiently.
It is clear that scarcity rents, while being economically justifiable for the sake of efficient allocation, would be very difficult to justify in political terms if their final result is to increase operators' profits. PWSS operators should not be the beneficiaries of these rents, which should more appropriately correspond to water taxes levied by the public authority.
2.4. Could the public sector achieve the same results without pricing?
We have seen that optimal prices in theory guarantee that an efficient supply capacity is chosen and that available water is allocated efficiently. They can also be used in order to foster any given water policy objective, provided that the incentive is strong enough. Could the public sector achieve the same results without pricing? In principle, the answer to this question is positive. Decisions concerning supply capacity could be supported by instruments like cost-benefit analysis, while well-conceived regulations could obtain the same allocative effects as prices.
While theoretically justified by market failures, however, efficient public provision of PWSS requires that (a) the state has the capacity to determine the efficient level of investment; (b) the state is also able to provide an efficient allocation of available water using alternative means to prices; (c) the public budget faces no constraints in raising the funds, via taxation or public debt; (d) funds are transferred to PWSS undertakings in a way that encourages their efficient behaviour.
Although these conditions can in principle be satisfied, empirical evidence shows us that this is not always the case. In general, decision making in the public sector is biased (e.g. by imperfections in the voting mechanisms, lobbying etc.) and does not necessarily lead to a socially optimal provision of public goods. As was noted already by Lindahl in 1890, this would be possible only by unanimous agreement of all stakeholders, since it requires each individual to pay an amount of money (tax-price) that corresponds to its willingness to pay (WTP) for that quantity of public goods. This cannot be achieved through majority vote, whose outcome in turn corresponds to the preference of "median voters". Even if they were motivated by the public interest, public operators would face the same difficulties as a private enterprise while addressing the problem of measuring the correct WTP of users, since all of them have the temptation to exaggerate their demand if they perceive that the cost will be socialized.
This consideration is important since it shows us that what is more important is that the beneficiaries of the public good pay in correspondence to their WTP and not the mere fact that they pay something to the system operator (as a price) or to a public authority (as a tax); what should be avoided for the sake of efficiency, in turn, is the use of flat charges (again, regardless of whether they derive from taxation or from lump-sum payments made to PWSS operators).
The second cause of inefficient behaviour among public entities is lobbying: public decision does not occur in an empty space, but is rather conditioned by the capacity of pressure groups to distort it to their own advantage. This situation is quite likely to occur in the traditional organization of the water sector, which is strongly dominated by the "iron triangle" between users, construction industry/operating firms and politicians/bureaucrats (Bressers et al., 1995) . This favours a vicious circle, which can easily be explained by models that interpret the growth of public expenditure on the basis of decoupling between (private) benefit and (social) cost of public works in the water domain, on rent-seeking and on the regulatory capture by those interests that have greater power and control over information sources, namely "water bureaucracies", large users and the construction industry (Massarutto, 1997; Anderson, 1983) .
Cultural factors can be invoked as well (Hoekstra, 1998) . The separating line between "water needs" and "water demands" is not always easy to trace; public opinion is usually very badly affected by droughts and the typical attitude is to consider water uses as "social rights". Although this is not necessarily true for every use of water, public consensus for government intervention aimed at dealing with water shortages is usually high; on the other hand, demand-side policies normally encounter stronger opposition, since they are associated with prices and privatization. Admiration for water works -considered to be a symbol of civilization since ancient times -adds to the argument.
As a result, a permanent tendency to exaggerate supply infrastructure can be predicted. Again, what is exaggerated? -this is a slippery concept to define. What is called gold plating becomes safety margin in times of stress. In fact, there is robust empirical evidence showing that most water development projects, considered ex post, fail by and large to pass a sound cost-benefit test (Anderson, 1983; Barraqué, 2000) . In order to reduce these risks and especially the temptation to inflate demand forecasts caused by rentseeking behaviour of potential water users, substantial cost recovery through user charges is considered as prerequisite.
3. Prices as allocative instruments: the empirical evidence 3.1. The structure of the cost function: PWSS utilities vs. water scarcity
The cost of PWSS services is represented by the cost of labour and capital used for providing infrastructure, operation and management (financial cost); by the opportunity cost of water as a scarce resource, namely its value in alternative uses (resource cost); and by externalities, that is damages that are eventually caused to other subjects without compensation (Rogers et al., 1998 (Rogers et al., , 2002 .
This fundamental statement should not make us neglect that, in the majority of cases, these cost dimensions are quite different, have different structures and drivers and are the responsibility of different actors along the value chain of water resources management (Massarutto, 2004) . Pricing is efficient provided that each of these actors -and not only final consumers -receives the correct incentives. However, achieving efficient allocation of water resources and of labour and capital used for water services is not the same problem and might lead to conflicting outcomes.
It is not obvious what unit of measure should be considered for the calculation of marginal cost. Some dimensions vary with the quantity supplied (this is especially true for resource costs, as well as for some components of financial costs such as pumping, storage and drinking water production), some others with pollution loads and environmental requirements (e.g. sewage treatment), still others on variables such as settlement density (pipelines and networks), population and number of connections (billing and customer care) etc. Externalities are often correlated with the presence of some facilities (e.g. a big dam altering solid transportation or causing landscape nuisance) rather than to water abstraction itself. The very fact that PWSS costs depend on the quantity of water supplied is therefore highly doubtful 6 . Therefore, marginal cost pricing and pricing by water quantity are rather different concepts; pricing on the basis of water quantity might well have an effect on quantity of water demanded, but this would not necessarily improve efficiency. This is particularly true in western Europe, where quantity issues are in general less important since water is available locally in enough quantity; or, if it does not have an effect, this is mostly owing to irrigation demand rather than to public supply, whose order of magnitude is much lower (Vergés, 2002) .
Second, even those cost components having a functional relation with quantity do not necessarily have the same functional relation. It might be expected, for example, that scarcity and environmental costs increase more than proportionally with quantity; quite the opposite happens for infrastructure costs, which are more likely to be declining with quantity. Therefore, using the price to reduce consumption and encourage water saving would require prices per cubic metre, possibly with rising blocks in order to penalize larger than average consumption; while the structure of financial costs suggests a decreasing block structure instead (Spulber & Sabbaghi, 1994) . For these reasons, pricing policy should adopt different measures and structures for the different components of the cost; simply summing together the cost components can result quite easily in a price structure that provides ambiguous and reciprocally conflicting signals.
When resource costs are not particularly relevant -i.e. because there is an adequate availability of cheap local resources and there are no major conflicts with other uses -the dominant component is infrastructure cost for distribution, whose characteristics are low short-run marginal costs (SRMC) and very high capital costs, resulting in very high long-run marginal costs (LRMC), usually declining or constant owing to economies of scale. Infrastructure is also very much more likely to be indivisible, thus invoking the problems discussed in Section 2.4.
When all local resources are used up, supplying additional quantities is usually possible only at a much higher marginal cost (e.g. long distance transfer, desalination, purchase of raw water from other utilities); this cost has to be added to the cost of distribution infrastructure. This consideration suggests that we identify two regions of the supply function of PWSS that have two rather different shapes and behaviours (Figure 7 ). Whether pricing is useful or not as an allocation instrument depends very much on the region where demand meets the supply curve.
Assessing the benefits: efficient investment levels
According to theory, as we have seen, water pricing provides a double allocative benefit: (a) it ensures that investment in new capacity will be done only if it is economically beneficial and (b) it ensures efficient allocation of available water, once facilities are in place. There is a permanent excess in demand 6 This statement is only apparently contradicted by empirical evidence showing that quantity is the main explanatory variable of total costs of water supply (Kirshen et al., 2004) . In fact what this literature suggests is that the size of PWSS systems matters (the total cost of a big system is larger than that of a smaller system) and quantity supplied is a good proxy of the size. Yet alternative proxies such as the number of connections or number of residents fit adequately as well. Also take note that econometric models usually have to rely on actual accounting systems, which normally do not consider (or at best severely underestimate) capital costs, which is by far the most important component of the cost. if water is under-priced. Yet how strong is this effect? What is the magnitude of efficiency losses associated with under-pricing?
The first benefit (efficient PWSS provision and infrastructure development) seems to be much more powerful as far as productive uses of water (industry and irrigation) are concerned. While these uses have normally little demand elasticity at the margin, they are in turn more sensitive to the difference between total cost and total surplus. Since water has for productive uses a finite value (that can be defined as the net additional profit they obtain from water), if the total cost they have to pay is higher than this value, they would simply give up water-intensive activities. Until this point, production processes normally require fixed quantities of water per unit of output, with limited saving opportunities. This is what Hanemann (1998) refers to as a "vintage" model of water demand, in which actual demand is function of the price that was charged -or announced -at the time initial investment was made. Waterintensive activities have some freedom to decide where to locate, but once they have started and their own assets are sunk, their reaction to water price adjustment is limited until price becomes so high that the whole economic margin is absorbed. This explains why the demand curve for productive uses has a typical "kinky" shape (Fontana & Massarutto, 1995) . In the irrigation sector, for example, this "exit price" depends on crops and on local conditions, but can be estimated in the range of 0.1-0.3 e/m 3 for open field crops and 0.5 -1 e/m 3 for high value crops and greenhouse productions (Massarutto, 2003) . It is important then that these uses pay the full cost from the beginning, in order to avoid investment that would not be worthwhile. After that, prices might still be used in order to orient some investment decisions (e.g. a water reuse system, recirculation of cooling water and reuse of effluents in the industry, drip or spray irrigation). However, for most uses (especially industrial ones) the "exit price" threshold is very high and does not relate to water supply costs (Fontana & Massarutto, 1995) ; prices would then hardly be effective if used alone. A more effective way to obtain the same result then could be to address the pressure factors directly (e.g. reduce subsidies paid for water-intensive crops). In any case, the opportunity to adopt price signals should be evaluated case by case, considering the practicable available options for water users and calibrating the economic instrument accordingly.
In the case of PWSS, in turn, we can imagine that factors behind urban development are far more independent of water price, more difficult to predict over the long run and less likely to depend on individual decisions. The choice whether to connect or not is not driven by economic considerations: PWSS is a basic good and we can assume that everybody connects; positive externalities do also arise when everyone is connected (e.g. public health) and it is therefore in the public interest that everyone is connected. When infrastructure is still to be built, its proper sizing is difficult to predict over the long run, given the long economic life; adapting it afterwards is possible but also often more costly. This statement could be still reinforced, if we consider that social costs caused by service failure are very high.
On the other hand, the decision to connect is seemingly constrained by the ability to pay and individual income. If first-time investment has to be recovered through charges, many users would not be able to connect and this would be reflected in higher risk of default for the whole system, higher bankruptcy risk for investors and higher individual fixed charges for those who connect.
All these considerations suggest that subsidizing investment in PWSS infrastructure from the public budget can have important advantages. Allocative benefits from charging the fixed cost to users seem quite modest. Some over-sizing of facilities could be planned more easily, in order to ensure higher flexibility and resilience to future change in demand (Kraemer, 1998) . The connection of all households could be easier to achieve; this is obviously particularly important in the early stages of urban development (Barraqué, 2005) . If an investment decision were to be taken by a service operator constrained by cost recovery and service obligations, it would be extremely risky. The state is normally in a far better position to carry economic risks and can achieve financial resources at a lower capital cost 7 (Hart, 2003; Lobina & Hall, 2003) . In fact, no developed country has started work on its water infrastructure without the substantial involvement of the public budget, at least for the provision of firsttime capital (Barraqué, 1995) .
A rough estimate 8 of the reconstruction value of existing PWSS infrastructure in Europe, based on a sample of countries shows a value of around 4.300 e per capita; if we extrapolate these figures to the whole European population, the total value can be collocated in a range between 1.500 and 2.000 thousand million e. Adopting a hypothetical average depreciation time of 30 years, this corresponds to an annual expenditure of 140 e per capita and a total annual expenditure of 50-60 thousand billion e. This baseline data should be further incremented in order to account for new investment required by the WFD. While no precise figures are available for the whole WFD, only the Wastewater Directive of 1992 (Dir. 271/92) is estimated to cost an overall 150 thousand million e over 10 years, corresponding to an annual investment of 40 e per capita. Drivers of this expenditure are not to be searched in water demand expansion, but rather in environmental and quality regulation (Table 1) .
It is difficult to believe that water pricing would have any meaningful effect on these costs, nor that there are significant efficiency gains to be expected from pricing in this case. A sound application of cost-benefit analysis to environmental regulation, as well as an incentive system aimed at maximizing efficiency of PWSS operators' capital expenditure would be much more useful, yet pricing in itself does not have a particular role to play. On the other hand, it is fundamental to note that such a tremendous financial effort is quite difficult to finance from the traditional channels of public finance. Pricing is then required not for the sake of efficiency, but rather in order to provide a source of alternative finance to taxation and public transfer from the government.
Considering in detail Italy as an example 9
, Massarutto (2006) shows that if FCR were intended in literal terms, including full depreciation of assets evaluated at their reconstruction value over their true economic life, and under alternative hypotheses on the cost of capital, the water bill would reach 0.7-2.6% of family income on average, with an increase of 75-350% over actual bills, depending on the financial scenario adopted 10 . Impact on low-income households could be far heavier, reaching in some cases a figure of around 7 -9%. Since most of this cost is due to investment, both for replacement of existing assets and for quality improvements required by the WFD, marginal cost pricing has little to offer, while a major problem is represented by the search of cost-sharing mechanisms that alleviate the impact on poorer households. Also, the study shows clearly that public-sector based finance ends in a final cost that is substantially lower than capital provision through the market. Clearly, the priority is how to put in place such systems in the context of a severely constrained public budget.
Assessing the benefits: efficient allocation of scarce water
We have already noted that using prices as a tool for water allocation makes sense only in situations characterized by high SRMC; this occurs in particular where water is physically scarce (SRMC arising from the scarcity rent) or in the case of long distance transfer, purchase of water from external suppliers, heavy costs for drinking water production (e.g. when raw water requires expensive treatment or desalination). This is however only a necessary condition. The second condition is that demand elasticity to price is sufficiently high.
It has been argued that the demand for public water supply is best approximated by a cubic function, implying that it has a median part with (relatively) higher elasticity and far lower Source: Barraqué, 2005. 9 The study is focused on Lombardia and Emilia-Romagna, among two of the wealthiest regions in Italy. Conclusions would be even more striking if other regions with lower per-capita income were to be considered. 10 Alternative scenarios contain a varying mix of market-based finance, for which a 7% return on investment is assumed and a public-sector-based scheme whose cost of capital is assumed to be 2%.
elasticity at the extremes; in the left extreme this can be justified by the fact that a certain quantity of water is indispensable and would be purchased at any price; while the right extreme is due to the fact that if prices are too low, their effect is negligible (Merrett, 1997 ) (see Figure 8 ). Applied studies on household water demand are now quite numerous throughout the world (OECD, 2000; Dalhuisen et al., 2001) . They have indeed some limits: they provide only a punctual estimate, which could be helpful for assessing the effects of prices in a given context, but not for deriving more general results. Moreover, the causal relation between price and quantity is not always clear: it has been suggested (Barraqué, 2003) that the driving forces behind reductions in water demand are exogenous, since they depend more on lifestyle, personal attitudes and cultures or are embedded in technical equipment and household appliances. In turn, since the largest part of the total cost is fixed, it has to be divided by a lower quantity, thus resulting in higher rates per m 3 . In many countries, an apparent increase in water prices (expressed by the average rate per m 3 ) corresponds to a reduction in water consumption, but not to a corresponding reduction of total costs; as a result, the fixed cost had to be spread over a lesser quantity, resulting in higher per/m 3 charges but almost constant per/household charges 11 . Other studies showing lower consumption for metered with respect to unmetered demand fail to consider that the choice of individual metering is usually facultative and it is likely that only those already knowing that their consumption is low will ask for the meter (Massarutto, 2004) . 11 A well-known case has occurred in the city of Berlin, where the sudden fall of water demand caused by a unit price increase caused serious technical problems to the network, requiring intervention by the local authority to promote an increase in water consumption. Despite these limitations, empirical studies provide a reasonable confirmation of the assumption about cubic water demand function. Most of them, while showing some responsiveness of certain components of water consumption to prices, are quite unanimous in showing values in the low range (in the reach of 0.2); these values are indeed much higher for the upper consumption blocks, while also appearing sensitive to the price level (Dalhuisen et al., 2001) . In any case, this discussion shows that it is fundamental to assess demand elasticity with respect to price in any given context before adopting a price reform aiming at demand management. In a context of low elasticity, pricing would simply have the effect of an implicit taxation on an essential good, generating revenues for the operator but having little effect on demand.
In the end, the usefulness of water pricing as a water allocation tool depends on the interaction between SRMC and demand elasticity. Table 2 summarizes the situations that might occur. Demand management through prices is a viable opportunity in case both SRMC and elasticity are high; in other situations this is not the case, either because price is not effective or because it is not useful.
It should also be considered that marginal cost pricing requires further costs (metering, meter reading, etc.) that have to be added to the total cost to be recovered. This factor further reduces the convenience of marginal cost pricing, requiring a high SRMC in order to justify these transactions costs. It can be estimated (see Table 3 ) that break even of metering costs requires an appropriate combination of total SRMC and demand elasticity 12 . In any case, it has to be stressed that this way of considering prices has nothing to do with cost recovery. As we have shown in Section 2.4, allocative efficiency requires that pricing equals the SRMC and eventually a scarcity rent, but this does not imply that the full cost is recovered. Lump-sum payments (e.g. a fixed connection charge) might well be used for this purpose, but this has no allocative implications. Moreover, effectiveness of pricing and price structure should not only be assessed having in mind final water users, but rather the whole value chain of PWSS. Table 3 . Welfare loss of free supply and metering with an isoelastic water demand curve.
Break-even marginal cost of metering e/m 3 (% of marginal cost) , metering is convenient only if its cost is lower than 0.06 e/m 3 , corresponding to the 6% of total cost. The simulation is made considering an isoelastic demand curve (i.e. with the hypothesis that elasticity remains constant along the demand curve).
While providing the correct signals to consumers, water prices should not provide the wrong signals to service operators and investors. While containing automatic incentives for operational efficiency, price structure should not also promote excessive investment. While consumers' demand is quite inelastic, PWSS operators usually have many available technological solutions to meet demands; their revenues should be structured in such a way as to promote sustainable and efficient investment levels.
If demand is inelastic, volumetric charges can be easily be transferred to consumers without affecting demand too much. Suppliers would have no incentive to reduce unnecessary investment, provided that its cost can be shifted to tariffs; moreover, there would be an interest in expanding water consumption, since its revenues would ultimately depend on quantity (Antonioli & Fazioli, 1999) . For this reason, investment costs should not be automatically transferred into tariffs; total revenue caps should be introduced. Operators' revenues and volumes sold should be decoupled in order to eliminate any incentive to maximize revenues through quantity; quantity-based charges should be conceived as water taxes accruing directly to the public authority.
Assessing the costs: computational difficulties
Proper evaluation of costs is far from a trivial exercise; three major difficulties can be cited. First of all, the costs to be considered should be only the efficient ones (i.e. those that would be incurred by a service supplier behaving efficiently and paying all inputs at their own marginal cost). This does not necessarily take place, because of a number of market imperfections along the value chain of water services. Finger et al. (2006) identify four different layers of transactions in the water market, linking the operator to public entities responsible for service provision (primary market I), to suppliers of inputs (secondary market II), to owners of water resources (tertiary market III) and to final customers (quaternary market IV). In each of these layers, market functioning is imperfect, owing to natural monopoly (IV market), vertical integration and information asymmetry causing transactions costs (II market), scarcity rents and externalities (III market) and imperfect contestability and transactions costs in the tendering process (I market). As a result, many inputs are purchased on non-competitive markets or through in-house transactions within large industrial groups; the actual level of cost depends on the incentives for efficiency embedded in the regulatory system (Finger et al., 2006) . If the actual full cost is considered as the basis of the calculation, this would correspond to a cost-based rate of return regulation, under which the operator is given the right to transfer all costs to the consumer. This pricing model would barely be more efficient than public subsidies: if the PWSS operator was guaranteed that investment costs were recovered with a given rate of return, they would have an incentive to inflate investment needs and oversize infrastructure.
Regulation of price dynamics may be adopted in order to promote efficiency of monopolist water services operators. Yet what is relevant in this case is total revenue in relation to the costs and the risks assumed by the operator. This does not have very much to do with the structure of water prices and their relation to marginal cost. It should be stressed, indeed, that volume pricing creates greater enforcement difficulties (e.g. billing costs, litigation) and greater uncertainties about the total revenue, thereby increasing the operating risk.
Second, two important components of the cost (depreciation and capital cost) are not straightforward, since their actual amount depends very much on accounting practices and on the patterns of allocating ownership of assets and economic risk between operators, users and public authorities 13 (Massarutto, 2005) . In fact the LRMC should include the full reconstruction value of assets depreciated over their whole economic life: this value is difficult to estimate given the very long economic life of many assets. Many of these have been realized by the public sector and it would be unfair to allow operators to charge these costs (at least without a warranty that the corresponding cash flows are ear-marked to the reconstruction of water assets and are not diverted elsewhere).
In turn, capital cost (that is the remuneration of investors) should be based on the opportunity cost of capital and the risk premium. The first component could be calculated on the basis of the risk-free market interest rate or by adopting a social rate of return, while the second cannot be assessed once and for all, since it depends ultimately on the patterns of risk allocation between operating company, public budget and water users.
Accounting practices in Europe vary quite a lot, because of the different patterns of regulation and contractual obligations. In the UK, for example, the regulatory asset base is calculated according to the cost that the operator has actually sustained in purchasing the assets and on the new investments that are planned at each price review (Buckland & Zabel, 1998) . In turn, the operator is permanently responsible for carrying out the necessary investment in order to maintain the assets and provide the service according to regulatory standards.
A similar approach is being introduced in Italy, where assets are supposed to be placed freely at the operator's disposal and only the investment foreseen in the asset management plan (on which basis operation is entrusted) is transferred into tariffs (Massarutto, 2005; Drusiani et al., 2004) . Depreciation schedules are calculated according to the accounting practices of water companies and are usually shorter than the economic life in order to fit the expectations of capital markets and consider the risk that a contract would not be renewed after termination.
In France, assets are owned by the municipality which bears the economic risk; the lease canon paid by operators (and transferred in water prices) corresponds to the reimbursement of loans, net of the contributions received from the Agences de l'Eau on an ear-marked basis (Ecologic, 1997 (Ecologic, , 1999 .
Wherever public management dominates, capital assets are not accounted for in a systematic way, since accounting practices are based on cash expenditure and not on costs. Initial capital is usually provided by public budget, while later operation has to cover management costs as well as maintenance. Renewals cannot be financed in this way, unless the public owner of assets calculates a depreciation rate based on reconstruction cost. This is what happens in Germany, where assets are owned by municipal companies and systematically revalued at the reconstruction cost and depreciated according to the economic life; this cash flow is controlled by publicly owned water companies (Ecologic, 1997 (Ecologic, , 1999 . In turn, this is what did not happen in a number of well known cases, like the British Water Authorities before privatization (Buckland & Zabel, 1998) or the Washington Public Power Water Supply System (Hanemann, 1998) . In similar cases bankruptcy is sooner or later unavoidable unless public money is used again at the time of replacement (Barraqué, 2005) . 13 Risk is borne by operators if prices are fixed as well as service obligation and the operator has to provide the investment needed to meet demand; it is borne by consumers in the case of cost pass-through of investment cost and cost-based regulation; it is borne by public authorities if contracts limit the total investment that the operator is committed to, and relies on public intervention when extra investment is needed. Normally in PWSS management, a varying mixture of these allocation patterns is adopted.
A third computational difficulty involves resource and environmental costs. Their magnitude can be estimated following various alternative procedures whose methodology is well consolidated (Young, 2004; Bergstrom et al., 2002) ; in turn, these values are normally site-specific, since they depend ultimately on the cheapest alternatives to supply alternative water demands. Complex and site-specific analysis is required in order to cope with the interdependence of uses and the interplay between natural and artificial water assets (IVM-EFTEC, 1998).
The main difficulty depends on the fact that environmental and scarcity costs are based on the value that alternative users attribute to water. It is not always clear, however, that demand for water and demand for a particular water resource (e.g. an individual aquifer) are not synonymous. Evaluation should carefully consider all alternative solutions that these users might adopt in order to satisfy their demand and not only consider the value of water for other users (Fontana & Massarutto, 1995) .
Concluding remarks
Water pricing is widely considered to be an important instrument that is aimed at achieving water sustainability. In this paper, we have discussed the basic reasons that lie behind this assumption and tried to single out advantages and shortcomings relative to water pricing. In the end, we have the impression that, while remaining useful and important, water pricing has probably become something of a myth and sometimes been misunderstood. Economists have supported water pricing in the belief that prices based on marginal costs provide the correct signals for supply and demand thereby favour economic efficiency both in the development of PWSS infrastructure and in the allocation of available water.
In this article we have argued that the efficiency argument is probably much weaker than is usually believed, at least in the field of PWSS services. Efficiency gains are limited and inefficiencies associated with unmetered supply are not so important, at least until physical scarcity of the resource is reached or unless new supplies entail high variable cost. In this case -and only in this case -it should be recommended to adopt prices that are proportional to quantity, and eventually more than proportional (increasing-block structures) in order to discourage consumption. This applies in particular when concrete and practicable alternatives for reducing water consumption are available and this is reflected by sufficiently high elasticity.
Also, supplying water may actually be a social transformation that sets the stage for a greater growth which might never occur without this access to water and services. Thus economics will have little relevance and will only come into play after the transformation occurs in order to help with allocation issues. In other words, the economic calculus of costs and benefits should incorporate the future value of water after the economic, social and urban development potential that originate from water have been fully achieved. This consideration, which is true for all infrastructural projects that substantially affect regional development potential, is particularly true for water facilities, given the extremely long economic life of water assets.
A water policy aiming at sustainability has different objectives from which we can derive different concepts of efficiency and also different consequences from an optimal pricing structure (Table 4) . Also, demand elasticity, transactions costs, supply indivisibility, long time horizon and related economic risk are all factors that reduce the likely benefits of pricing; while other non-economic issues, such as affordability and social discontent for market mechanisms to be introduced in the field of essential services reduce the political appeal of a water pricing reform aimed at FCR.
operators that have to run the system. It also allows more easily predictable revenues and thus a more precise calculation of financial exposure. This is not to say that operators' responsibility, guaranteed by price revenues, should be limited to operation and renewal. Once the system is stable enough, the economic risk embedded in network extension is limited and can at least gradually be assumed by private companies.
Self-sustainability of PWSS systems is finally a fundamental precondition of private sector involvement and should thus be considered attentively, especially where development of PWSS services is expected to rely on the contribution of the private sector. If this is the case, the need for prices to be calculated on a marginal cost base is less compelling, while some equalization and cross subsidies might well be acceptable according to the specific constraints that public finance has in each context. What is more important, in turn, is to distinguish the way people pay for water from the way PWSS operators obtain their revenues; efficiency in PWSS management and investment decisions is at least as important as individual behaviour. Most literature on water pricing has failed to consider that the interposition of a monopolist PWSS operator between consumers and environment can generate a perverse effect on prices if they can be easily transferred to consumers, especially in the context of low demand elasticity.
In most European countries, "water pricing" has far less to do with the attempt to foster efficiency through economic signals and much more with the idea that costs of water services should be shared by each territorial community in a fair and sustainable way (Massarutto, 2005) . It is more concerned with the search for social justice, subsidiarity and self-responsibility of users' communities rather than with the "pigovian" idea of fully internalizing external costs (Barraqué, 2005) .
In order to guarantee that financial resources are endogenous enough for the water sector, it is not so important to decide whether individuals pay as water consumers or as taxpayers. In fact whether what they pay belongs to one or the other category is not even easy to assess, since it often shares some characteristics of both. Prices and taxes should more correctly be interpreted as two extremes of a continuum rather than as opposites. Water charges can entail territorial redistribution as well as having some of the characteristics of taxation (e.g. being compulsory, being calculated on the base of indicators of wealth, being constrained by a total revenue that should be guaranteed anyway) while remaining devoted to the coverage of PWSS costs (Massarutto, 2005) .
Mutualisation and solidarity schemes can very well be present; in the European experience this is achieved in various ways through territorial redistribution (England and Wales, Italy); through ear-marked taxation and the creation of special water budgets (France); and through inter-sectoral cross-subsidies (Germany). Public contribution can be still important, either as a source of first time capital or because the public sector still bears some part of the economic risk and the related cost either by explicit subsidies or by indirect ones such as low interest loans, specialized water banks guaranteed by the government, and so on. Seen in this perspective, water pricing seems to be more important as an instrument of public finance than as an economic instrument aimed at promoting efficiency.
